Summary We tested a
There has been renewed interest in the There has been renewed interest in the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry phenomenological tradition in psychiatry (Owen & Harland, 2007) which offers a (Owen & Harland, 2007) which offers a range of hypotheses about different psychorange of hypotheses about different psychopathological states. One notable hypothesis pathological states. One notable hypothesis is that schizophrenia is an impairment of is that schizophrenia is an impairment of commonsense knowing (practical reason), commonsense knowing (practical reason), with a preservation -or even accentuation with a preservation -or even accentuation -of systematic cognition (theoretical rea--of systematic cognition (theoretical reason). This concept was made famous by son). This concept was made famous by the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist and can even be found in the anthropological can even be found in the anthropological writings of but has never been writings of but has never been experimentally tested. Previous experimenexperimentally tested. Previous experimental work on rationality in schizophrenia tal work on rationality in schizophrenia has aimed to explain delusions in schizohas aimed to explain delusions in schizophrenia in terms of impairments of formal phrenia in terms of impairments of formal reasoning Kemp reasoning (Garety & Hemsley, 1995; Kemp et al et al, 1997) . Results do not generally con -, 1997) . Results do not generally confirm this model . firm this model .
In line with the phenomenological In line with the phenomenological hypothesis, we tested whether tasks that hypothesis, we tested whether tasks that are correct from a theoretical (or formal are correct from a theoretical (or formal logical) point of view but depart from logical) point of view but depart from practical knowledge (common sense) would practical knowledge (common sense) would be performed better by people with be performed better by people with schizophrenia than by healthy controls. schizophrenia than by healthy controls.
METHOD METHOD
Most philosophers conceptualise theoretiMost philosophers conceptualise theoretical rationality as formal logical rationality cal rationality as formal logical rationality for which deductive logic is held as the for which deductive logic is held as the paradigm. Practical rationality or 'common paradigm. Practical rationality or 'common sense', however, has been more difficult to sense', however, has been more difficult to conceptualise. It is generally taken to conceptualise. It is generally taken to denote non-formal rationality -a form of denote non-formal rationality -a form of knowing that provides the background knowing that provides the background assumptions about the world that are the assumptions about the world that are the basis of shared human practice. It is tacit basis of shared human practice. It is tacit knowledge within a culture, and includes knowledge within a culture, and includes such things as the pre-theoretical knowlsuch things as the pre-theoretical knowledge that the sun rises in the east or that edge that the sun rises in the east or that hospitals are buildings. Such knowledge is hospitals are buildings. Such knowledge is presupposed and used in everyday practice, presupposed and used in everyday practice, and as such becomes something that is and as such becomes something that is separate from theoretical knowledge. The separate from theoretical knowledge. The concept of common sense is that there is a concept of common sense is that there is a form of rationality that is independent of form of rationality that is independent of theoretical rationality. The experiment we theoretical rationality. The experiment we report assumes these two concepts and report assumes these two concepts and takes them to be fundamentally different. takes them to be fundamentally different.
We operationalised theoretical reasoning We operationalised theoretical reasoning using syllogisms that were deductively valid using syllogisms that were deductively valid or invalid, and common sense using syllogisor invalid, and common sense using syllogistic content that strongly conformed to or detic content that strongly conformed to or departed from practical knowledge. Two types parted from practical knowledge. Two types of syllogism were constructed, in each of of syllogism were constructed, in each of which there was a conflict between deductive which there was a conflict between deductive truth and commonsense truth. The first type truth and commonsense truth. The first type was non-commonsense syllogisms that were was non-commonsense syllogisms that were valid (labelled 'NCS'), for example: valid (labelled 'NCS'), for example:
'all buildings speak loudly; 'all buildings speak loudly; a hospital does not speak loudly; a hospital does not speak loudly; therefore, a hospital is not a building.' therefore, a hospital is not a building.'
The second type comprised commonsense The second type comprised commonsense syllogisms that were invalid (labelled syllogisms that were invalid (labelled 'CS'), for example: 'CS'), for example:
'ifthe sun rises, thenthe sunisinthe east; 'ifthe sunrises, thenthe sunisinthe east; the sunisinthe east; the sunisinthe east; therefore, the sun rises.' therefore, the sun rises.'
Participants were asked by the interviewer Participants were asked by the interviewer (G.O.) to accept the first two sentences of (G.O.) to accept the first two sentences of each syllogism as true and then to decide each syllogism as true and then to decide on the truth or falsity of the third sentence. on the truth or falsity of the third sentence. They were told that this rule applied to all They were told that this rule applied to all the problems and were asked to state it the problems and were asked to state it repeatedly until it was clear that they repeatedly until it was clear that they understood it. All participants read the understood it. All participants read the problems aloud. Syllogisms were scored as problems aloud. Syllogisms were scored as correct if they were answered logically. correct if they were answered logically.
To be more certain that our syllogisms To be more certain that our syllogisms did generate subjective conflict between a did generate subjective conflict between a logical and a commonsense interpretation logical and a commonsense interpretation in healthy people, we had previously conin healthy people, we had previously conducted an independent pilot study in which ducted an independent pilot study in which we tested 21 healthy individuals. Verbal we tested 21 healthy individuals. Verbal reports confirmed the conflict between reports confirmed the conflict between logical and commonsense interpretations. logical and commonsense interpretations. We discarded three syllogisms that accrued We discarded three syllogisms that accrued high scores on the basis that their commonhigh scores on the basis that their commonsense content was too weak, leaving eight sense content was too weak, leaving eight NCS syllogisms and seven CS syllogisms NCS syllogisms and seven CS syllogisms for inclusion in the study reported here. for inclusion in the study reported here.
Ethical approval for the study was Ethical approval for the study was gained and all participants gave informed gained and all participants gave informed consent. People diagnosed with schizoconsent. People diagnosed with schizophrenia using standardised criteria (DSMphrenia using standardised criteria (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and healthy controls were asked to 1994) and healthy controls were asked to solve the syllogisms in a case-control design. solve the syllogisms in a case-control design. Patients were selected from two innerPatients were selected from two innerLondon psychiatric hospitals; the sources London psychiatric hospitals; the sources were two general in-patient wards and the were two general in-patient wards and the out-patient and in-patient facilities of a sinout-patient and in-patient facilities of a single service specialising in schizophrenia. All gle service specialising in schizophrenia. All participanting patients were taking antiparticipanting patients were taking antipsychotic medication. The control group psychotic medication. The control group was selected from a wide variety of inforwas selected from a wide variety of informal sources, including acquaintances, pormal sources, including acquaintances, porters and staff at several hospitals, and ters and staff at several hospitals, and advertisement. Exclusion criteria for both advertisement. Exclusion criteria for both groups were age outside the range 18-65 groups were age outside the range 18-65 years; premorbid IQ, estimated using the years; premorbid IQ, estimated using the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1994) , outside the range 75-125 (as at 1994) , outside the range 75-125 (as at extreme values this measure is a poor guide extreme values this measure is a poor guide to full-scale IQ (Russell to full-scale IQ (Russell et al et al, 2000) ); , 2000)); English not native language; other neuroEnglish not native language; other neurological or psychiatric disorder or substance logical or psychiatric disorder or substance misuse. Medical records were reviewed for misuse. Medical records were reviewed for all patients and a clinical interview was all patients and a clinical interview was conducted by a psychiatrist (G.O.) to conducted by a psychiatrist (G.O.) to ensure that criteria were met. Of the 22 ensure that criteria were met. Of the 22 patients approached, two were excluded patients approached, two were excluded because of elicited histories of epilepsy or because of elicited histories of epilepsy or heavy substance misuse and three because heavy substance misuse and three because of NART IQ score of NART IQ score 5 575. Of the 21 poten-75. Of the 21 potential control group members, one was tial control group members, one was excluded because aged excluded because aged 4 465 years and one 65 years and one because of IQ score because of IQ score 4 4125. 125. Our primary measures were number of Our primary measures were number of syllogisms correct as a total and as subsets syllogisms correct as a total and as subsets according to type (NCS or CS). Potential according to type (NCS or CS). Potential confounding factors were considered to be confounding factors were considered to be IQ, age, gender and years of education. IQ, age, gender and years of education.
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( 2 0 0 7 ) , 1 9 1 , 4 5 3^4 5 4 . d o i : 1 0 .11 9 2 / b j p . b p .1 0 7. 0 3 7 3 0 9 v. CS) and their interaction. CS) and their interaction. Our hypothesis was that the schizophrenia Our hypothesis was that the schizophrenia group would outperform the control group. group would outperform the control group.
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RESULTS RESULTS
Groups were well matched, with 17 patients Groups were well matched, with 17 patients and 19 controls. There was no significant and 19 controls. There was no significant difference between the groups in premorbid difference between the groups in premorbid IQ ( IQ (t t¼7 70.87, 0.87, P P¼0.4), age ( 0.4), age (t t¼1.25, 1.25, P P¼0.22) or years of education ( 0.22) or years of education (t t¼7 70.06, 0.06, P P¼0.96). About half (53%) of the control 0.96). About half (53%) of the control group were men, compared with 65% of group were men, compared with 65% of the schizophrenia group. the schizophrenia group. Table 1 shows the group statistics. As Table 1 shows the group statistics. As predicted there was a highly significant predicted there was a highly significant main effect by group ( main effect by group (F F (1, 68) (1,68) ¼8.002, 8.002, P P¼0.006), with patients outperforming 0.006), with patients outperforming controls. There was also a main effect by controls. There was also a main effect by syllogism type ( syllogism type (F F (1, 68) (1,68) ¼52.916; 52.916; P P5 50.001), 0.001), but no interaction of syllogism type by but no interaction of syllogism type by group ( group (F F (1,68) (1,68) ¼0.157, 0.157, P P¼0.69). The main 0.69). The main effect by syllogism type showed that both effect by syllogism type showed that both groups scored better on the NCS syllogism groups scored better on the NCS syllogism type than on the CS syllogism type. We take type than on the CS syllogism type. We take this to be the well-replicated 'belief bias' this to be the well-replicated 'belief bias' effect , i.e. that logic has a effect , i.e. that logic has a larger effect on unbelievable (NCS) than larger effect on unbelievable (NCS) than on believable (CS) conclusions. on believable (CS) conclusions.
In exploratory analysis of the group difIn exploratory analysis of the group difference, the effect size using the Cohen's ference, the effect size using the Cohen's d d statistic was 0.82 (large) for the CS syllogism statistic was 0.82 (large) for the CS syllogism type and 0.54 (medium) for the NCS syllotype and 0.54 (medium) for the NCS syllogism type. Similarly, comparisons of means gism type. Similarly, comparisons of means showed significance for the CS showed significance for the CS syllogism syllogism type ( type (t t¼7 72.37, 2.37, P P¼ 0.026) but not for the 0.026) but not for the NCS type ( NCS type (t t¼7 71.65, 1.65, P P¼0.11). This sug-0.11). This suggests that there might be an underlying gests that there might be an underlying interaction between syllogism type and interaction between syllogism type and group, with the CS syllogism type (commongroup, with the CS syllogism type (commonsense reasoning) accounting for most of the sense reasoning) accounting for most of the group difference, and that our failure to find group difference, and that our failure to find it was due to inadequate statistical power. it was due to inadequate statistical power.
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION
Our main results show that under conditions Our main results show that under conditions where common sense and logic conflict, peowhere common sense and logic conflict, people with schizophrenia reason more logically ple with schizophrenia reason more logically than healthy individuals. On a straightforthan healthy individuals. On a straightforward interpretation this is either because ward interpretation this is either because people with schizophrenia are better at logic people with schizophrenia are better at logic or because they are worse at common sense. or because they are worse at common sense. We present some exploratory evidence that it We present some exploratory evidence that it is because they are worse at common sense, is because they are worse at common sense, but the question remains open. but the question remains open.
A few limitations must be mentioned. A few limitations must be mentioned. The number of participants was small, The number of participants was small, experimental designs using philosophical experimental designs using philosophical concepts are novel and case-control studies concepts are novel and case-control studies cannot control for unknown confounding cannot control for unknown confounding factors. For example, our stimuli did not factors. For example, our stimuli did not allow for correct rejections of nonallow for correct rejections of noncommonsense syllogisms or correct commonsense syllogisms or correct acceptance of commonsense syllogisms. acceptance of commonsense syllogisms.
The results are intriguing because they The results are intriguing because they shed light on reasoning in schizophrenia shed light on reasoning in schizophrenia but also have significance beyond but also have significance beyond schizophrenia research. They suggest that schizophrenia research. They suggest that in situations where commonsense knowlin situations where commonsense knowledge is at stake, formal norms of rationality edge is at stake, formal norms of rationality are violated by people with schizophrenia are violated by people with schizophrenia to a lesser extent than by healthy individto a lesser extent than by healthy individuals. People with schizophrenia seem to uals. People with schizophrenia seem to have a bias towards theoretical rationality have a bias towards theoretical rationality over and above practical rationality. It is over and above practical rationality. It is an ongoing dispute within philosophy of an ongoing dispute within philosophy of science whether, as a matter of principle, science whether, as a matter of principle, theoretical reason has priority over practitheoretical reason has priority over practical reason or vice versa (Thagard, 2004) . cal reason or vice versa (Thagard, 2004) . Given that schizophrenia is at its core a Given that schizophrenia is at its core a pathological state of thinking, our results pathological state of thinking, our results suggest that concepts of rationality that suggest that concepts of rationality that prioritise theoretical reason over and above prioritise theoretical reason over and above practical reason might apply more accupractical reason might apply more accurately in a pathological example of human rately in a pathological example of human thinking than in a healthy one. This is an thinking than in a healthy one. This is an example of how experimental psychoexample of how experimental psychopathology can shed light on fundamental pathology can shed light on fundamental philosophical debates that have not been philosophical debates that have not been settled by argument alone. settled by argument alone. 
